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Abstract
How do the complex institutions involved in wage setting affect wage changes?  The International
Wage Flexibility Project provides new microeconomic evidence on how wages change for
continuing workers. We analyze individuals’ earnings in 31 different data sets from sixteen
countries, from which we obtain a total of 360 wage change distributions. We find a remarkable
amount of variation in wage changes across workers. Wage changes have a notably non-normal
distribution; they are tightly clustered around the median and also have many extreme values.
Furthermore, nearly all countries show asymmetry in their wage distributions below the median.
Indeed, we find evidence of both downward nominal and real wage rigidities.  We also find that the
extent of both these rigidities varies substantially across countries.  Our results suggest that
variations in the extent of union presence in wage bargaining play a role in explaining differing
degrees of rigidities among countries.
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Workers’ wages are not set in a spot market.  Instead, the wages of most workers – at
least those who do not switch jobs -- typically change only annually and are mediated by a
complex set of institutions and factors such as contracts, unions, standards of fairness, minimum
wage policy, transfers of risk and incomplete information.  The goal of the International Wage
Flexibility Project (IWFP)—a consortium of over 40 researchers with access to individual
workers’ earnings data for 16 countries—is to provide new microeconomic evidence on how
wages change for continuing workers. Wage changes due to worker mobility are governed by
different processes and are beyond the scope of this study.
A key question in the theoretical and empirical literature, as reviewed in Camba-Mendez,
García and Rodríquez Palenzuela (2003) and Holden (2004), is the extent to which job stayers
resist wage cuts – that is, the extent to which downward wage rigidity exists. These studies have
yielded remarkably inconsistent findings, both across different countries and across different data
sets for the same country. For example, in U.S. data, studies using company wage records
typically show almost no wage cuts, while several papers analyzing individual data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) find what appear to be many nominal wage cuts (those
studies take no account of measurement error -- for discussion, see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry,
1996; Altonji and Devereux, 2000). However,  studies of individual earnings data from Great
Britain show less evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity than what is discerned from
analysis of US data (Nickell and Quintini, 2003;  Smith, 2000).  Moreover, almost all of the
existing studies concentrate on nominal wage rigidity, even though workers may resist real wage
cuts as well as nominal wage cuts.
The International Wage Flexibility Project sought to reconcile these divergent results.
The goals of the project were to gather international data on wages that make it possible to
describe the extent of wage flexibility, with a particular focus on the extent of downward wage
rigidity, and then to determine how measures of wage flexibility are affected by the wage-setting
regimes that typically vary by country and by the different types of data on wages. This paper
analyzes individuals’ earnings changes in 31 different data sets from which we obtain a total of
360 wage change distributions –one for each year in each data set.  These data were analyzed by
13 research teams from participating countries and a coordinating team based at the European2
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Cleveland, the Brookings Institution
and the Universities of Oslo and Zurich.
Like previous studies, we find a remarkable amount of variation in percentage wage
changes across individuals in nearly every country in every year. We estimate that the standard
deviation of annual wage changes within countries averages at least 7.7 percentage points,
although this measure contains some uncertainty due to the extent of measurement error. Wage
changes in nearly every country in every year have a notably non-normal distribution. Workers’
wage changes are both much more clustered around the median and have many more extreme
values than the normal distribution. Moreover, nearly all countries show asymmetry in their
wage distributions below the median. One common asymmetry is a high incidence of wage
freezes and apparent lack of nominal wage cuts, which we take as evidence of downward rigidity
in nominal wages. A second asymmetry is a tendency for workers’ wage changes to clump in the
vicinity of the expected rate of price inflation, which we take as evidence of downward real wage
rigidity. We find evidence of substantial variation across countries in the extent of both
downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity, even after we control for data set
characteristics. When we examine how our measures of rigidity relate to a number of
characteristics of labor markets in the countries of our sample, only greater union density appears
to have a robust relationship with downward real wage rigidity – that is, countries with greater
union density have a greater incidence of downward real wage rigidity.
International Data on Wage Changes
The 31 data sets analyzed for the International Wage Flexibility Project cover over 31
million wage changes and are diverse with respect to source, coverage, years, and definitions of
variables of interest. An important advantage of studying many different data sets is that we can
consider how various data set characteristics can cause observed differences in wage rigidity
across countries.
Table 1 describes the data sources. The three main sources of data are employment
registers, household surveys and employer surveys.  An employment register, which is
maintained by a government for the administration of taxes and/or benefits, covers all workers in
a specified universe and has minimal reporting error.  Some country teams worked with random
samples drawn from the registers, while others analyze the entire census.  Household surveys
sample from the universe of all workers, but typically rely on respondent recall, and so they are3
subject to both sampling and reporting error.  Employer wage and salary surveys typically cover
all workers in the occupations and firms in their purview and draw their data from payroll
records, but vary considerably in how many occupations or firms they cover.  The employer
surveys in the IWFP are particularly comprehensive because they are conducted by national
employer associations and are used extensively for policy and managerial purposes.
The time periods covered by the different data sets vary, with some starting in the early
1970s and some running through the beginnings of the 2000s, with an average of twelve years
per data set.  The total 360 data set-years observed include multiple data sets for twelve
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Data sets also vary in terms of the compensation measure available.  In each data set, we
attempt to measure the wage component of compensation only.  Ideally we would analyze the
agreed-upon hourly, weekly, monthly, or annual compensation rate for workers in each of our
samples.  This measure would include not just monetary compensation, but also the value to the
worker of all non-pecuniary compensation as well.  We do not view total compensation cost to
employers as a good proxy for this concept, because it can be affected by price adjustments in
components such as workers’ compensation insurance or employment taxes, without a change in
the effective compensation that the worker sees.  Focusing on the wage component avoids this
problem of shifting costs and has the additional benefit of being the most consistent concept
across countries.  Focusing on wages does have the drawback of omitting consideration of other
aspects of compensation that may be deliberately adjusted by employers to increase flexibility.
However, some evidence suggests that these other adjustments may not have much effect on
downward wage rigidity: for example, Lebow et al. (2003) find no evidence that U.S. employers
change other types of remuneration so as to circumvent binding downward rigidity of base
wages. Finally, we exclude large outliers in wage changes because they likely reflect wage
reporting errors or unidentified job changes, rather than the actual experience of ongoing
workers. Increases of more than 60 percent in wage data or 100 percent in annual income data
and cuts of more than 35 percent in wage data or 85 percent in income data were eliminated.
Eleven of our 31 data sets have either information on workers’ hourly wages, or measures
of their base earnings over fixed periods of time that are equivalent to hourly wage data for our
purposes.  In the other cases, we have monthly or annual income data that must be converted to
hourly wages using hours data (usually the normal hours of work). Since hours measures are4
often imprecise for a number of reasons this procedure introduces error into our wage measure
akin to those in survey data. We construct our measure of annual percentage wage changes by
taking the difference between consecutive years’ log reported or computed wages.
As noted earlier, we restrict our analysis to job stayers so that we can concentrate on the
wage rigidity in ongoing employment relationships.  In our data, restricting attention to job
stayers typically reduces our samples by about 17 percent.
How Wage Changes Are Distributed
To illustrate some key features of wage change distributions, Figure 1 shows the actual
distribution of changes in log wages (represented as percentage changes in levels) received by
wage earners who were heads of households in the United States in 1987, white-collar workers in
Finland in 1988, all workers in the United Kingdom in 1984 and all workers in Ireland in 1996.
The histograms are constructed using intervals that are 1 percentage point wide, so that the
height of the rectangles shows the fraction of people with wage changes in that range.  In
addition, the fraction of workers with no change in their pay is shown with the dark bar at zero.
1
A number of key features typical of wage change distributions are illustrated in these four panels.
First, all four examples show considerable variation across workers in the magnitude of wage
changes within a year.  The average standard deviation of measured percentage wage changes
across all our data sets is 9 percentage points. Second, median wage changes typically (in 80
percent of data-set year observations) exceed contemporary or lagged inflation rates (shown in
black lines).  This pattern is expected when productivity is growing and labor market slack is not
excessive.
Third, wage changes are not normally distributed.  Given the median and variance
actually observed, people’s wage changes are much more clustered and peaked around the
median change than in a normal distribution.  Also, the wage distributions have many more
extremely high raises than would occur in a normal distribution.  A lesser-known statistical
distribution called a Weibull distribution does fit to the upper tail of each wage distribution (that
is, the area above the median) much better than does the normal distribution. When a variable
1 The cells on either side of zero are slightly less than 1 percentage point wide as the cell at zero includes
observations within 0.017 (0.1 in countries where wages are constructed from annual income) percentage points of
zero and those observations are not included in the cells on either side. We did this because problems in the accuracy
with which earnings and hours data were recorded in some data sets created tiny phantom wage changes.5
has a Weibull distribution the density declines exponentially in the log of the distance from the
mode.
For wage changes below the median value (the lower tail), only for Ireland does the
Weibull distribution fit the data particularly well.  The Irish wage changes do not display two
features found in other distributions.  First, the Irish workers have a lower incidence of wage
freezes (the spike at zero) than do the U.S. and U.K. workers; indeed, Irish workers reported
almost as many nominal wage cuts as would be expected with a symmetric distribution.  Second,
the Irish workers’ wage changes were not as strongly clustered near the inflation rate (either
current or last year’s rate), as were the U.K. and Finnish workers’ wage adjustments.  One main
reason why the Irish distribution of wages has higher variance and it is less smooth than the other
distributions is because of the data source. The Irish data reported here are from the European
Community Household Panel, a data set with fewer observations and more reporting error than
most of our other data sets.
Figure 2 shows broader evidence of two key asymmetries: one is nominal wage freezes,
while the other is the clustering of wages around the level that would represent a real wage
freeze. For these figures, we include all dataset years with the exception of those datasets
reporting annual income data, because the categories used to classify observations are not the
same as those used in the analysis of the other data sets. This leaves us with 273 dataset years.
  The left panel shows the asymmetry caused by downward nominal wage rigidity.  In
this figure we average the frequency of workers in each wage change cell across datasets.  On
average, about 8 percent of workers receive nominal wage freezes in the wage samples. This
may not seem like much, but recall that in many years many of the countries covered were
experiencing considerable inflation. The left-hand panel also shows that the distribution of wages
is not symmetric; besides the spike at zero there are fewer observations below zero than
symmetry with the upper half of the distribution would lead one to expect.
The left panel of figure 2 does not indicate the extent of downward real wage rigidity,
since rates of actual and expected inflation vary across countries and years. To do this, we can
instead center the wage change distribution for each country and year on the interval that
contains its median wage change, as shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 2. We also drop the
nominal wage freezes seen in the left panel. Hence,  the height of each bar shows the average
share of workers receiving a wage change of the specified amount above or below the median
change in that year (providing the worker did not have a nominal wage freeze). We expect that,6
averaged over the business cycle, wage growth equals price inflation plus productivity growth.
Sixty-one percent of contemporaneous inflation rates fall in the histogram cell containing the
median or the two cells just below it and fifty-one percent of the previous years’ inflation rates
fall in that range. Thus the raises of workers with expected real wage freezes will be clustered a
percentage point or two below the median wage change
To make it easy to see what symmetry would imply for the distribution in the right hand
panel of figure 2 we have superimposed the outline of the upper half of the distribution on the
lower half of the distribution. The incidence of wage changes in the lower tail is substantially
lower than in the symmetric distribution, with the exception of the two cells just below the
median, where the incidence of wage changes is higher than the symmetric distribution. This
suggests that many wage change observations have been affected by downward real wage
rigidity, which has pushed these low wage changes up from the left of the lower tail towards the
bins closer to the median. Thus, across these national samples, many more workers experience
wage increases close to the expected rate of inflation than symmetry would imply, and many
fewer receive wages changes below that level.
Recall that not all countries show signs of downward real rigidity, thus, this divergence
from symmetry is all the more notable because it is driven only by a subset of countries.
Furthermore, if we add the wage freezes back in, distributing them proportionally over the lower
tail with the missing observations, the asymmetry is still notable.
Clearly, the dispersion of wage changes is different above and below the median. We
calculated a measure of standard deviation separately for the portion of the distribution above the
median and below the median for all the IWFP data sets.
2 This measure for the lower is smaller
than the measure for the upper tail both on average -- 7.4 percent versus 13 percent -- and in
almost every case –(356 out of 360 IWFP data set years).
3  The difference in dispersion between
the upper and lower tail is driven mainly by the two sources of asymmetry we just described. A
closer examination reveals that the difference between the dispersion of the upper and lower tail
declines as wage inflation increases.  This pattern seems to be due to the lower incidence of wage
freezes as the median wage change moves further away from zero.
2  Specifically, we calculated the square root of the mean squared deviation of observations from the median, and
carried out this calculation separately for the upper and the lower tail.
3 The exceptions are France in 1980 and 1994, Italy in 1991, and Switzerland in 1999.7
Finally, we can learn about errors in wage data from the auto-covariance of individual
wage changes.  We are computing wage changes from wage levels reported a year apart.  Thus,
the presence of errors in the reporting, recording, or calculating of the wage level in any year  --
assuming that errors are not correlated from one year to the next -- would cause large positive
wage changes to be followed by small or negative wage changes in the next year, while small
changes or negative changes would be followed by large changes. All else equal, the more errors
present in a particular data set, the more negative will be the auto-covariance of wage changes.
We have computed the auto covariance of wage changes for every year and data set in our study
excluding the data sets where the wage measure is based on annual income.
4  Nearly all (91
percent) of the observations are negative, with an average value of -0.002. Negative auto-
covariance could also be a feature of the true wage change distribution.  However, in the few
data sets where base wages are reported in administrative data, which we would least expect to
show errors, the auto-covariance is essentially zero.  This finding suggests that measurement
error is the source of virtually all auto-covariance in our wage change data.  If the only source of
auto-covariance in our data is measurement error, and the measurement errors are uncorrelated
from one period to the next, then the average standard deviation of measurement error in the data
is about 4 percentage points.  This would imply that the average standard deviation of true wage
changes is about 7.7 percentage points across our data sets.
5
What Statistical Distributions Imply about Wage-Setting
The features of the wage change distributions highlighted above -- their tendency to
follow a Weibull distribution above the median, with higher peaks at the median value and more
frequent high positive values compared to the normal distribution, along with the evidence of
nominal and real asymmetries – may reveal quite a bit about the wage setting process.  The
central limit theorem states that a variable will tend to be normally distributed when a large
number of independent influences affect it in an additive manner. Thus, in more practical terms,
4 If the dates over which income are measured are not synchronized with wage changes the income measure will
confound two wage levels. This induces a positive correlation in wage changes on top of the negative correlation
caused by errors and makes the income data inappropriate for this exercise.
5 Under the assumptions just specified the auto-covariance will equal minus the variance of the measurement error.
Thus adding it to the variance of wages in our data sets yields an estimate of the true variance of wage changes and
taking the square root of that yields the true standard deviation of wage changes. We average this value across all
countries (except those where wages are based on annual earnings which have a more complicated covariance
structure) and years to get 7.7 percentage points.8
suppose each worker’s performance was scored separately for a number of independent tasks or
competencies that comprised a job.  Then, suppose that the wage increases for the workers are
based on additive rewards for the number of independent successes a worker has, compared to
average performance. In such a setting, wage changes should be approximately normally
distributed.  However, the evidence shows that wages are not normally distributed, but instead
have more observations at their peak and in their tails than a normal distribution.
A Weibull distribution will provide a good approximation to the distribution if, instead,
workers’ raises are based on sequential standards, where only those who meet all prior standards
are considered for the next level, and at each level, rewards increase exponentially.  For example,
assume that workers’ abilities are tested in a prescribed sequence and at each stage the surviving
workers either fail and drop out of further contention or “make the grade” and go on to compete
in the next round.
 6
People of only average performance receive the median wage changes.  Those who
achieve one level of distinction (but no more) receive a small bonus of size b above the median
wage change.  From among those who succeed the first time, some will achieve just one more
level of distinction and receive an increase of b2
a (a>1).  Others will manage to distinguish
themselves even further (a third time) and receive a bonus of size b3
a.  If a constant fraction of
workers fails to reach each successive level of distinction then the distribution of wage increases
will be approximated by a Weibull distribution.
7
The relatively good fit of the Weibull distribution to the upper tail suggests that a
survivor process like this may be at work determining wage increases. The process just described
is similar in some ways to Rosen’s (1986) tournament model; though that model was meant to
describe the distribution of wages and changes over a career rather than a single year. It also
6 While this section uses individual performance to describe a process that generates a Weibull distribution, this
process could also work among “surviving” teams, establishments or firms.















where p is the fraction of workers at each level of distinction who fail in succeeding to each higher level of
distinction. The Weibull cumulative distribution function that we use to describe the distribution of wage changes
above the median can be viewed as an exponential distribution where the argument of the distribution has been
scaled by taking it to a power between 0 and 1.  Exponential distributions provide a much better fit to wage changes
above the median in our wage distributions than do normal distributions.  However, the Weibull allows an even
better fit. Actual wage changes are both more clustered and have more extremely large raises and wage cuts than
predicted by exponential distributions.9
doesn’t explain what we find in the lower tail of the distribution. The pattern in the bottom tail of
the wage distribution is more varied. If there are few wage freezes, in either real or nominal
terms—as we see in the case of Ireland in 1996 in Figure 1—it appears that wage changes lower
than the median are determined by a similar process to wage increases.  That is, cascades of
shortcomings lead to deviations from the average that increase at an exponential rate with more
failures.
However, labor markets in many countries do display a degree of downward wage
rigidity. The presence of downward nominal wage rigidity can explain the presence of large
numbers of wage freezes--that is, the spike at zero--and the relative lack of wage cuts.
Downward real wage rigidity can account for the tendency for a larger number of workers to
receive wage changes closer to the expected rate of inflation than might be expected if symmetry
were preserved. That would also explain the paucity of observations below this range in the
lower tail.  Finally, the tendency for wage setters to make more errors in wage setting due to
mistaken expectations and lags in the process would be greater the higher the rate of inflation –
perhaps particularly so at rates of inflation above 10 percent. The presence of both downward
nominal and real wage rigidity would explain the tendency for the variance of the lower tail to be
less than the variance of the upper tail, while the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity
would explain why the difference declines as the rate of wage inflation rises.
Measuring Rigidity
We can use the observed deviations from symmetry in the wage change distributions to
construct measures of the extent of downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity for each
dataset-year.  In conceptual terms, we are seeking measures that are largely independent of the
economic conditions in a country at a given time.  Thus, we do not want a measure such as the
fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes in a year, because this fraction varies with the
expected rate of inflation, and so could prove a misleading basis for thinking about the extent of
wage rigidity.  Instead, we construct measures that represent the fraction of workers “covered
by” each type of wage rigidity. In most cases this “coverage” is informal, not contractual.  An
alternative term would be “susceptible to” rigidity.  However, wage rigidities are likely to reflect
worker resistance to wage cuts, and we think of workers whose wages are rigid as being
“covered” by some implicit or explicit agreement or norm that limits their employers’ ability to
cut their wages.10
We call our measures of downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity n and r,
respectively.  Each is conceived of as the fraction of workers who, if they are in the position of
being scheduled for either a nominal or real wage cut, whether because of individual
performance or external conditions, would receive a nominal or real wage freeze instead.
For downward nominal wage rigidity, our measure is straightforward. We assume that
everyone who had a nominal wage freeze would have had a nominal wage cut in the absence of
downward nominal rigidity and construct
n = fn/(fn+cn)
where fn is the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes and cn is the fraction with nominal
wage cuts.
8
Our estimate of downward real wage rigidity is conceptually similar, but for several
reasons more complicated in practice. First, because inflation expectations can differ between
firms and individuals, there is no sharp spike in the distribution where we can confidently say
that everyone at that spike experiences a real wage freeze. Thus, our measure of downward real
wage rigidity is based on the fraction of observations missing from the lower tail, below our
estimate of the expected rate of inflation, as compared to the equivalent area of the upper tail of
the distribution (i.e., that part starting from the median plus the distance between the median and
the expected rate of inflation).
9 The idea is that in the absence of downward real wage rigidity
there would be as many people in the lower tail as in the corresponding region of the upper tail,
but that downward real wage rigidity causes some of those who would be in the lower tail to be
piled up around the expected rate of inflation.
 If everyone had exactly the same expected rate of inflation, and the distribution of wage
changes in the absence of wage rigidity was symmetric, then the fraction of workers in the upper
tail minus the fraction in the lower tail below the expected rate of inflation would equal the
8 Although we allow for wage changes slightly more or less than zero to be in the zero bin to compensate for some
numerical accuracy problems in the data we are using, we are confident that the zero wage changes are
overwhelmingly exact wage freezes. The bounds around zero were chosen to be less than one currency unit (for
example, cents for wages, dollars or euros for annual income, and so on) for nearly all observed wage levels.
9 In one fifth of our country-year samples, the expected rate of inflation is greater than the median wage increase,
implying that “the lower tail” covers more than 50 percent of the observations. For these country-years, this measure
of downward rigidity cannot be constructed.11
fraction of workers with real wage freezes. But, even if our estimate of the expected rate of
inflation coincides with the median of the expected rate of inflation for our observations, half of
all wage changes will in fact be based on inflation expectations that are lower than our estimate.
If these wage setters receive a wage change equal to their own expected rate of inflation, their
wage change will be below our expected rate of inflation. Thus, even if downward real wage
rigidity binds for these observations, they will still not be missing in the lower tail to the left of
our estimated expected rate of inflation. Since half those with freezes will be missing from the
lower tail, we multiply the missing observations in the lower tail by two.
To calculate the fraction of workers covered by downward real wage rigidity, we must
divide the number of workers with real wage freezes by the number potentially affected, which is
all workers who would have received a wage change below our estimate of the expected rate of
inflation in the absence of downward real rigidity which we estimate as equal to the fraction of
workers in the upper tail. Formally, we obtain
r = fr/(fr+cr)  =  2(u-l)/u,
where u is the fraction of observations in the upper tail above m+(m-ʌ
e), m is the median and ʌ
e
is the expected rate of inflation, l is the fraction of observations in the lower tail below ʌ
e, fr =
2(u-l) is the fraction of workers for whom downward wage rigidity binds, and fr + cr= u is thus
our measure of real freezes plus real cuts. We construct ʌ
e as the predicted rate of inflation from
a country-specific regression of annual rates of inflation on lagged inflation.
A large value for real rigidity r may reflect phenomena other than downward real wage
rigidity since a concentration of wage changes at values other than the expected rate of inflation
could affect it.  For example, if government, business, and labor agree on a minimum wage
increase meant to apply to all workers, our measure could show this as real rigidity even if the
minimum wage increase allowed real growth or decline. In the interests of expositional brevity,
we call r downward real rigidity even though we recognize that the focal change could deviate
from price inflation expectations.
It is worth noting that the concepts we attempt to measure here are quite different from
the common conception of nominal and real wage rigidity as slow adjustment to nominal and
real shocks. While downward nominal and downward real rigidity might be causes of slow
adjustment, there could be other sources of slow adjustment. Moreover, remember that these12
measures of nominal and real rigidity do not show the actual percentage of workers experiencing
nominal and real rigidity, but instead are an attempt to capture what share of workers, relative to
the group that might otherwise have experienced declining nominal or real wages, instead
experiences wage rigidity.
As illustrations, we report these measures for the four distributions shown in Figure 1.
The U.S. economy in 1987 shows high nominal rigidity with n=54 percent, but little real rigidity
with r= -3 percent.
10  Finland’s white-collar employees in 1988 show low nominal rigidity at
n=18 percent, but high real rigidity at r=99 percent. The United Kingdom in 1984 shows fairly
high nominal and real rigidity, with n=28 percent and r=30 percent. Ireland in 1996 shows little
of either rigidity, with nominal rigidity n=3 percent and real rigidity r=1 percent.
Variation in our Rigidity Measures
We now wish to explore whether wage rigidity differs across countries. We find
considerable variation in the extent of both real and nominal rigidity across countries when we
average across all data sets and time, as shown in Figure 3. Averaging across years and data sets
within countries, estimates of the fraction of workers covered by downward nominal wage
rigidity n averages 28 percent and ranges from 4 percent in Ireland to 58 percent in Portugal,
while the comparable average for real rigidity r is 26 percent, with a range from 1 percent in
Switzerland to 68 percent in Finland.  The standard deviations of n and r across all our dataset-
year observations are 13 and 22 percentage points, respectively. The differences across countries
are statistically significant at any conventional level of significance.
11
We compared our measures to those from two other cross-country studies that use
different methodologies to estimate the average extent of downward nominal wage rigidity.  Our
country average estimates of downward nominal rigidity have correlation coefficients of 0.46
with 15 country estimates from Holden and Wulfsberg (2006)
 12 and 0.45 with 11 country
10 Even though we think of r as the fraction of workers covered by downward real rigidity, our measure take a
negative value if the fraction of observations in the lower tail below the expected rate of inflation is greater than the
fraction in the upper tail to which it is compared.
11 Specifically, we regress these country year measures on a set of country indicator variables and test their joint
significance. For both downward nominal rigidity (r) and downward real wage rigidity (n), we easily reject the
hypothesis that the extent of measured rigidity is constant across countries at any conventional level of significance.
For downward real rigidity (r) F=7.63 df(15, 257). For downward nominal wage rigidity (n), F=10.01 df(15, 344).
12 Estimates from Holden  and Wulfsberg’s appendix table13
estimates from Knoppik and Beissinger (2005).  We would not expect a perfect correlation
because the estimates cover different time periods and diverge in data and technique.  Thus, we
consider the correspondence between these studies to be reasonably strong.
Do these differences in wage rigidity across countries reflect real difference in labor
markets across the countries or do they reflect only differences in the way wages are reported,
recorded and computed in the different data sets? To find out, we run regressions with our
measure of nominal rigidity n and real rigidity r as the dependent variables. For the explanatory
variables, we first use indicator variables for a number of different data set characteristics:
whether we have hours information, whether the wage measure is based on total earnings or base
wages, whether the wage measure is based on annual income, whether the data were collected
with a labor market survey, and whether the data came from the European Community
Household Panel. We also add our index of measurement error – the auto-covariance of wage
changes – as an explanatory variable. Several of the data set characteristics are statistically
significant. In particular, there are positive and statistically significant coefficients on the auto-
covariance of wage changes in both regressions, suggesting that measurement error biases both
of our rigidity measures downward. However, even after adjusting for data set characteristics,
country differences in both downward nominal and downward real rigidity remain statistically
significant at the 0.001 level.
13
Since the cross-country differences in wage rigidity do not seem readily explainable by
the characteristics of the data, we next examined the correlation of our rigidity measures with a
number of measures of labor market institutions and other characteristics of the economy which
might influence the functioning of the labor market.  The variables we examined included two
measures of strike activity, union density, union coverage, two indexes of the level at which
bargaining takes place, two indexes of the degree of coordination in bargaining, a corporatism
index combining level and coordination in bargaining, the fraction of part-time workers in the
labor force, the fraction of temporary workers in the labor force, two measures of income
distribution, six measures of the average tax wedge in compensation, four indices of employment
protection legislation, two measures of the average replacement rates for unemployment benefits,
13 For downward real rigidity (r), F=2.24 (df=15,251). For downward nominal wage rigidity (n), F=7.96
(df=15,338). We tested the validity and robustness of these country estimates in a number of ways laid out in full
detail in Dickens et al. (2006). The two main changes were to incorporate corrections for measurement error and to
estimate the size of rigidities by comparing true wage changes with the hypothetical wage change distribution that
would prevail in the absence of rigidities.  The differences across countries remain statistically significant.14
duration of unemployment benefits, an indicator variable for the presence of any sort of
institutional wage indexation, indices of the extent of active and passive labor market policies,
two measures of the impact of minimum wages, a measure of the openness of the economy, and
two indices of the extent of product market regulation.
For each measure we correlated country averages for the variable with country averages
for our rigidity measures and we also regressed our country year estimates of our rigidity
measures on the individual labor market variables and our data set characteristic variables.
Scatterplots of the relationship between n and r and three of the many variables we examined are
shown in Figure 4 – namely employment protection legislation, corporatism, and union density.
Of all the characteristics we examine, only the relationship between real rigidity and
union density is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both the country and data-set-year
level regressions. There we find that increasing union density is associated with increasing real
rigidity. It is plausible that collective bargaining would give more attention to real, as opposed to
nominal, compensation because the participants may be more likely to understand the difference,
hold expectations for the future inflation, and be more likely to be familiar with inflation
forecasts. Furthermore, unions might also have the bargaining power to ensure compensation for
inflation in situations where individual workers might have to accept constant nominal wages.
But even the connection between unions and wage rigidity, although it may seem obvious
in theory, appears somewhat shakier in our data than one might expect. For example, if union
density is a significant predictor of real wage rigidity, one might also expect that bargaining
coverage would also be positively related with real rigidity, but the correlation is only significant
at the .1 level in a one-tailed-test in both specifications.
When it comes to the effect of union density and coverage on nominal rigidity, the simple
correlations of country averages are both negative, but neither is statistically significant.
However, when we use annual observations, control for data set characteristics, and use Huber-
White standard errors clustered on country, the correlations become statistically significant
negative. We conjecture that by causing workers to focus on real rather than nominal values
unions may reduce the importance of downward nominal wage rigidity.
We examined our estimates of downward real and downward nominal rigidity for
evidence of time trends, and find no consistent evidence of changes over time across countries.
However, there are a few country specific trends. Notably, there is some evidence of downward15
real rigidity in the US in the 1970s that virtually disappears in the 1980s coincident with the
decline in pattern bargaining by US unions (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992).
We also examined the relationship of wage rigidity to inflation. As explained earlier, our
measures of the extent of nominal and real wage rigidity were constructed with the intention that
they should not be much affected by inflation, and they are not.  However, the fraction of
workers actually affected by downward nominal wage rigidity (which of course differs from our
measure describing the likelihood that a worker facing the probability of stagnant or declining
nominal wages receives a wage freeze) should rise as inflation falls.  Indeed, we find that the
fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes in any year declines by more than 1.4 percentage
points for each percentage point increase in the median wage change.  The coefficient hardly
changes when we add controls for data set characteristics and country indicator variables and
gets larger when we add indicator variables for year.
Conclusion
With data from 15 European countries and the United States we find that wage change
distributions have a number of characteristics in common and some important differences. In all
countries at nearly all times, the distribution of wage changes is notably non-normal.  The
Weibull distribution provides a much better fit to the upper tail above the median. The lower tail
of the wage distribution varies from country to country. In some countries, there is little
downward rigidity in nominal or real wages, and in those cases the lower tail of the wage
distribution takes on the Weibull form. Other countries show downward rigidity of nominal
wages, but not real wages; downward rigidity of real wages, but not nominal wages; or even a
fair degree of downward rigidity in both real and nominal wages.
We find substantial differences across the countries in our study in the extent of both
nominal and real downward wage rigidity.  Across countries, we estimate that an average of 28
percent of workers are covered by downward nominal rigidity, in the sense that 28 percent of the
wage cuts that would have taken place under flexible wage setting are prevented by downward
rigidity.  Correspondingly, an average of 26 percent of workers are covered by downward real
rigidity, in the sense that 26 percent of the real wage cuts that would have taken place under
more flexible wage setting are prevented by downward rigidity.  Measurement error appears to
bias both measures downward, so the incidence of both nominal and real rigidities is probably
higher.  Nevertheless, these similar averages mask considerable variety: country averages for16
downward real wage rigidity range from 1 percent in Switzerland to 68 percent in Finland with a
standard deviation across countries of 22 percentage points. For downward nominal wage
rigidity, country averages for the fraction of workers covered range from 4 percent in Ireland to
58 percent in Portugal, with a standard deviation of 13 percentage points. The cross-country
differences in wage rigidity do not appear to arise as an artifact of the different data sources used.
Wage-setting behavior and wage rigidity have important implications for firm behavior,
unemployment, macroeconomic stability and other areas of economics, yet many questions
remain to be answered about why these patterns occur. We have offered some hypotheses about
the sort of wage-setting mechanisms that could underlie a Weibull distribution, but these
explanations deserve further consideration and exploration. Although we examined many labor
market and related economic variables that might plausibly help explain differences across
countries in the extent of wage rigidity, the only firm connection we find is that union density
has a robust positive association with downward real rigidity.17
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Wage  changes  observed  31.3  million  Observations  per  data  set  year  87,000
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1. Austria Social Security 1972-1998 Annual earnings
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9. Portugal Quadros de Pessoal 1991-2000 Wages/hour
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*Data sources not noted as employers or surveys are collected from administrative sources.**German wage data
refer to earnings for most of the time period, but to wages before 1984.
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Figure 4: Correlations of Institutional Variables with Rigidity Measures
Sources and definitions:
Aggregate EPL: OECD (2004), Index of the strictness of employment protection legislation, Categorical variable
coded 0 to 6, where 6 is most restrictive
Corporatism: Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Wage-bargaining corporatism index, summary measure of
collective bargaining structures of centralization and coordination, Categorical variable coded 1= low to 3 =high
Union Density: Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), The proportion of workers who are members of a trade union,
in percent.25
Appendix
Sources of Institutional Variables
1.  Checchi and Lucifora (2002). Variables include: index of wage indexation (extended by the
authors); measures of earnings inequality; measure of openness to international trade; index of
overall product market regulation; ratio of minimum to average wage.
2.  Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), including updates, where available, from OECD
(2004, 2005). Variables include: percentage of trade union coverage; percentage of trade union
membership; wage bargaining centralisation index; wage bargaining coordination index; average
and marginal tax wedge measures; index of employment protection legislation on aggregate,
regular and temporary contracts; gross benefit replacement rate; ratio of minimum to median
wage; index of overall product market regulation; expenditure on active and passive labour market
policies.
3.   Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). Variables include:
percentage of part-time employment; percentage of temporary employment.
4.  Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (1998). Variables include: bargaining level.
5.  International Labour Organisation (see www.ilo.org). Variables include measures of strike
activity.
6.  Nickell and Nuziata (2000). Variables include: index of bargaining coordination; average tax
wedge; index of employment protection legislation; average replacement rate; duration of
unemployment benefits.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 96 - OCTOBER 2006 27
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